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The Helms-Burton Act and Transnational
Legal Process
By WILLIAM S. DODGE'
The Helms-Burton Act' is little more than a year old, yet it has al-
ready become one of the most controversial and widely discussed pieces
of international legislation in decades.2 It has provoked strong objec-
tions from many of the United States' closest allies and treaty partners.
The European Union has challenged Helms-Burton as a violation of
* Assistant Professor, University of California, Hastings College of the Law. B.A.,
Yale College 1986; J.D., Yale Law School 1991. This introduction is a revised version
of remarks given at the Hastings International and Comparative Law Review symposium
on January 25, 1997. It discusses developments regarding the Helms-Burton Act through
July 31, 1997. I am grateful to Chadwick J. Elliston and Sheryl L. Skibbe for valuable
research assistance.
1. Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-114, 110 Stat. 785 (Mar. 12 1996) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 6021-91) [hereinafter
"Helms-Burton Act"].
2. See Brice M. Clagett, Title III of Helms-Burton: IVho is Breaking International
Law-The United States, or the States That Have Made Themselves Co-Conspirators with
Cuba in its Unlawful Confiscations, 30 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & EcoN. (forthcoming
Fall, 1997) [hereinafter Clagett, Who Is Breaking International Law]; David P. Fidler,
LIBERTAD v. Liberalism: An Analysis of the Helms-Burton Act from within Liberal In-
ternational Relations Theory, 4 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 297 (1997); Andreas F.
Lowenfeld, Congress and Cuba: The Helms-Burton Act, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 419 (1996);
Brice M. Clagett, Title III of the Helms-Burton Act is Consistent with International Iaw,
90 AM. J. INT'LL. 434 (1996); Brice M. Clagett, A Reply to Professor Lowenfeld, 90 AM.
J. INT'L L. 641 (1996); Satumino E. Lucio, II, The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Soli-
darity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996: An Initial Analysis, 27 U. MAM INTER-AM. L. REv.
325 (1995-96); David S. De Falco, Comment, The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Soli-
darity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996: Is the United States Reaching Too Far?, 3 J. INT'L
LEGAL STUD. 125 (1997); W. Fletcher Fairey, Comment, The Helms-Burton Act: The Ef-
fect of International Law on Domestic Implementation, 46 Aii. U. L. REv. 1289 (1997);
Jonathan R. Ratchik, Note and Comment, Cuban Liberty and the Democratic Solidarity
Act of 1995, 11 AM U. J. INT'L L. & PoL'Y, 343 (1996); Anthony M. Solis, Comment,
The Long Arm of U.S. Law: The Helms-Burton Act, 19 Loy. LA. INT'L & CO~ia. L.J. 709
(1997); Brian J. Welke, Comment, GATT and NAFTA v. The Helms-Burton Act: Has the
United States Violated Multilateral Agreements?, 4 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 361
(1997); see also Steven E. Hendrix, Tensions in Cuban Property Law, 20 HASTINOs
INT'L & COMp. L. REv. 1 (1996); Matias F. Travieso-Dias, Alternative Remedies in a Ne-
gotiated Settlement of the U.S. Nationals' Expropriation Claims Against Cuba, 17 U.
PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 659 (1996); Matias F. Travieso-Dias, Some Legal and Practical
Issues in the Resolution of Cuban Nationals' Expropriation Claims Against Cuba, 16 U.
PA. J. INT'LEcON. L. 217 (1995).
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GAIT, and a showdown with the United States over the issue-temporar-
ily averted in April of this year-still threatens to cripple the new dispute
resolution procedures of the World Trade Organization ("WTO"). At the
same time, the Act has raised a host of fascinating international legal is-
sues, not just under treaties like GATT and NAFTA but under customary
international law as well.
The articles in this symposium issue make important contributions
to our understanding of the legal and policy issues surrounding Helms-
Burton. David Kaye, an attorney-advisor at the State Department, ex-
plains the relationship between Helms-Burton and the espousal of inter-
national claims.4 He argues that Helms-Burton is consistent with inter-
national claims law and that international law allows the United States to
attribute liability to nationals of third States for trafficking in property
expropriated by Cuba, taking issue with the contrary opinion of the Or-
ganization of American States' Inter-American Juridical Committee
("IAJC") on each of these points.5 John Yoo, a law professor at Boalt
Hall, tackles the question whether Helms-Burton is consistent with inter-
national law limitations on jurisdiction to prescribe and with the United
States' treaty obligations under NAFTA and GATT.6 He also argues that
Helms-Burton unwisely uses the federal courts as instruments of foreign
policy, which not only threatens the neutrality and legitimacy of the fed-
eral courts but also compromises U.S. foreign policy by vesting decisions
with judges who cannot respond flexibly to political developments and
do not (at least until the issue works its way to the Supreme Court) speak
with one voice.7 Robert Muse, an attorney representing several U.S.
corporations holding claims against Cuba, argues that Title [II of Helms-
Burton violates the "nationality of claims" principle in international law
by extending its right of action to U.S. citizens who were Cuban nation-
als at the time their property was taken.8 Kim Campbell, the former At-
3. See infra notes 69-76 and accompanying text.
4. David Kaye, The Helms-Burton Act: Title III and International Claims, 20
HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 726, 736 (1997).
5. Id. at 736-40. For the IAJC's opinion on Helms-Burton, see Organization of
American States: Inter-American Juridical Committee Opinion Examining the U.S.
Helms-Burton Act (Aug. 27, 1996), 35 I.L.M. 1322 (1996).
6. John Yoo, Federal Courts as Weapons of Foreign Policy: The Case of the
Helms- Burton Act, 20 HASTINGS INT'L & CoMP. L. RaV. 742, 746-54 (1997).
7. Id. at 754-64.
8. Robert L. Muse, The Nationality of Claims Principle of Public International Law
and the Helms-Burton Act, 20 HASTINGS INT'L& COMP. L. REv. 767, 769-81 (1997).
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torney General and Prime Minister of Canada, emphasizes Canada's
commitment to democracy and human rights in Cuba through a policy of
engagement like the United States' policy toward China and Vietnam.9
Helms-Burton, she argues, is an unacceptable attempt to impose the U.S.
policy toward Cuba on other nations and undermines the concept of an
international system based on rules.10 The Mexican Government criti-
cizes Helms-Burton and the U.S. embargo of Cuba as violations of inter-
national law and calls for their immediate repeal."
In this introduction to the symposium, I offer a brief overview of the
Act and the foreign responses to it-both public and private.' 2 The pattern
of U.S. extraterritorial regulation, foreign response, and U.S. accommoda-
tion is a familiar one to international lawyers, and I compare the contro-
versy over Helms-Burton to the Fruehauf case of the mid-1960s and the
Soviet Pipeline dispute of the early 1980s.13 Finally, I use Helms-Burton
to illustrate the dynamic that Professor Harold Koh has termed "transna-
tional legal process," in which public and private actors interact to make,
interpret, enforce and internalize international law.1
4
I. An Overview of Helms-Burton and Foreign Responses
President Clinton signed the Helms-Burton Act into law on March
12, 1996, shortly after the Cuban Air Force shot down two Cessna planes
flown by Brothers to the Rescue, a Cuban-American organization. The
stated purposes of the Act are twofold: first, to speed the replacement of
the Castro regime with a democratic government in Cuba;' and second,
9. Kim Campbell, Helms-Burton: The Canadian View, 20 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP.
L. REV. 786, 792-93 (1997).
10. Id. at 789-92.
11. Mexico's Position Regarding the Helms-Burton Act and Cuba, 20 HASTINGS
INT'L & CoMP. L. Rav. 794 (1997).
12. See infra notes 15-49 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 50-59 and accompanying text; see also William S. Dodge, Ex-
traterritoriality and Conflict-of-Laws Theory. An Argument for Unilateralism, 39 HARV.
INT'L L.J. (forthcoming Winter, 1998) (discussing the pattern of extraterritorial regula-
tion, foreign response, and eventual accommodation in the antitrust context).
14. See infra notes 60-86 and accompanying text. See generally Harold Hongju
Koh, Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. REv. 181 (1996) [hereinafter Koh, Trans.
national Legal Process]; Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International
Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599 (1997) (book review) [hereinafter Koh, Why Do Nations
Obey?].
15. Helms-Burton Act § 3(l)-(5).
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to protect the rights of U.S. nationals whose property was expropriated
by the Cuban government.
1 6
Titles I and II of the Act focus on changing the government in Cuba.
Title I freezes the economic embargo on Cuba as it existed on March 1,
1996, removing the President's previous authority to modify those re-
strictions. 17 It further directs the Administration to oppose any termina-
tion of Cuba's suspension from the Organization of American States
("OAS") and to oppose Cuba's admission to international financial or-
ganizations like the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and
the Inter-American Development Bank.18 It requires the Secretary of the
Treasury to withhold from any international financial institution that ap-
proves a loan or other assistance to Cuba an amount equal to the amount
of that loan or assistance' 9 and calls for reduced aid to states of the for-
mer Soviet Union that furnish assistance or engage in nonmarket trade
with Cuba.20 Title II of Helms-Burton authorizes the termination of the
economic embargo against Cuba once the President certifies that a tran-
sition government is in power.21 "Transition government" and "demo-
cratically elected government" are defined in great detail.22
Titles I and IV of the Act focus on the property rights of U.S. na-
tionals. Title I is the most controversial aspect of Helms-Burton. It
permits any U.S. national who has a claim for property confiscated by
Cuba since January 1, 1959 to bring suit in U.S. courts against any per-
son who "traffics" in such property.23 "Trafficking" is defined broadly
to include buying, leasing, managing, using and even "benefiting from"
confiscated property. 24 The trafficker is liable for the entire amount of
25 26the claim and in many instances for treble damages. Thus, an English
company buying sugar from a Cuban state enterprise that operates a
plantation expropriated from a U.S. national may be liable for damages
16. Id. § 3(6).
17. Id. § 102(h).
18. Id. §§ 104(a) & 105.
19. Id. § 104(b).
20. Id. § 106.
21. Id. § 204.
22. Id. §§ 205-206.
23. Id. § 302(a).
24. Id. § 4(13).
25. Id. § 302(a)(1).
26. Id. § 302(a)(3).
[Vol.20:713
Helms-Burton and Transnational Legal Process
in an amount three times the value of the plantation.27 If the threat of
such liability seems as though it might chill foreign investment in and
trade with Cuba, that is precisely the point. Congress intended to dis-
courage foreign investment in Cuba both to deny the benefits of foreign
investment to the Castro regime and to prevent foreign investment from
clouding the title to confiscated property making restitution of that prop-
erty to U.S. nationals more difficult.23 Title IV of the Act is further de-
signed to discourage foreign investment in Cuba by excluding from the
United States officers and controlling shareholders of foreign companies
that traffic in confiscated property, as well as their spouses and minor
children.2
9
The response of foreign companies to Helms-Burton has been
mixed.3 0 In late July of this year, the state-owned Italian telecommuni-
cations company STET agreed to make a one-time payment to ITT for
authority to invest in the Cuban telephone system formerly owned by
ITT, thereby avoiding sanctions under Title IV.31 The United States also
points to Cementos Mexicanos' (Cemex's) withdrawal from a contract to
manage a cement plant in Cuba and ING Bank's decision not to renew
$30 million in loans to Cuba's state-owned sugar trading company as
evidence of the law's impact. On the other hand, both Cemex and ING
are still involved in other activities in Cuba.3 In February of this year,
Wal-Mart pulled Cuban pajama's off the shelves of its stores in Canada,
but resumed the sales to avoid penalties under a Canadian law prohibit-
ing compliance with the U.S. embargo of Cuba. 34 And while Helms-
27. See Lowenfeld, supra note 2, at 426 (offering this example).
28. Helms-Burton Act § 301(6).
29. Id. § 401(a).
30. Pascal Fletcher, War of Words over Impact on Cuba of Helms-Burton, FN.
TwIEs, Mar. 12, 1997, at4.
31. U.S. Ends Probe as 177" and STET Reach Pact Over Cuban Property, WALL ST.
J., July 24, 1997, at B7; Guy de Jonquieres & Robert Graham, STET Secures Helms-
Burton Waiver, FIN. TIMEs, July 24, 1997, at 5.
32. Fletcher, supra note 30; see also Gordon Cramb & Pascal Fletcher, U.S. Law
Forces 'ING out of Cuban Sugar, FIN. TIMes, July 5, 1996, at 5.
33. Fletcher, supra note 30.
34. John Urquhart, Wal-Mart Puts Cuban Goods Back on Sale, WALL ST. J., Mar.
14, 1997, at A3. Wal-Mart potentially faced U.S. liability not under Helms-Burton but
under the earlier Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, 106 Stat 2575 (1992) (codified at 22
U.S.C. § 6001-10). The Canadian law forbidding compliance with both Helms-Burton
and the Cuban Democracy Act is the Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act, as amended.
1997]
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Burton has deterred new investment by some large Canadian companies
with significant U.S. assets, smaller Canadian companies seem to be
filling the gap.35
On the governmental level, the foreign response to Helms-Burton
has been swift and vehement. The European Union objected immedi-
ately to the Act 36 and Canada and Mexico requested consultations with
the United States under Chapter 20 of NAFTA.37  While Canada and
Mexico have yet to challenge Helms-Burton formally as a violation of
NAFTA,38 the European Union did challenge the Act as a violation of
GATT.39 Meanwhile, the OAS General Assembly, over the objection of
the United States, directed the Inter-American Juridical Committee to
examine the validity of Helms-Burton under international law, and the
Committee concluded that Helms-Burton violated international law.40
Moreover, the European Union, Canada, and Mexico all adopted laws to
counteract Helms-Burton by forbidding their nationals from complying
with the Act and permitting their nationals to "clawback" any awards
See Canada: Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act Incorporating the Amendments
Countering the Helms-Burton Act (Oct. 9, 1996), 36 I.L.M. 111 (1997).
35. Canadian Firm to Develop Cuban Mine, 14 INT'L TRADE REP. 1247 (July 16,
1997). At least one large Canadian company that has been subjected to sanctions under
Title IV of Helms-Burton, Sherritt International, has pressed forward with additional in-
vestments in Cuba. Pascal Fletcher, Sherritt Defies U.S. Sanctions, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 28,
1997, at 6.
36. See European Union: D~marches Protesting the Cuban Liberty and Democratic
Solidarity (Libertad) Act (Mar. 5, 1996 and Mar. 13, 1996), 35 I.L.M. 397 (1996).
37. See Sanctions: U.S. Agrees to Talk with Canada, Mexico on Helms'-Burton Cuba
Sanctions Measure, 13 INT'L TRADE REP. 12 (Mar. 20, 1996). Consultations among the
NAFTA countries failed to resolve Canada's and Mexico's complaint. See Sanctions:
NAFTA Designates Confer on Complaint Against Helms-Burton Under Chapter 20, 13
INT'LTRADE REP. 27 (July 3, 1996).
38. Sir Leon Brittain, the European Union's Trade Commissioner, has criticized
Canada for stalling under NAFTA while the European Union has pressed forward with
its challenge under GATT. See Brittain Berates Canadians, FIN. TIMES, May 2, 1997, at
4.
39. See United States-The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act: Request
for the Establishment of a Panel by the European Communities, WT/DS38/2 (Oct. 8,
1996) (on file with the author).
40. See Organization of American States: Inter-American Juridical Committee
Opinion Examining the U.S. Helms-Burton Act (Aug. 27, 1996), 35 I.L.M. 1322 (1996).
Mr. Kaye takes issue with several of the IAJC's conclusions. See Kaye, sapra note 4, at
736-40.
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against them under Helms-Burton by filing countersuits in their own
courts .4 1
President Clinton sought to accommodate these foreign reactions by
exercising his authority under section 306(b) of the Act to suspend Title
II's right of action for six months.42 On January 3, 1997, President
Clinton announced that he would suspend Title MI's right of action for an
additional six months43 and would "expect to continue suspending the
right to file suit so long as America's friends and allies continue their
stepped-up efforts to promote a transition to democracy in Cuba. ' 4
However, these actions did not satisfy the United States' allies, and
the European Union continued to press ahead with its complaint that
Helms-Burton violates GATT. The United States responded that as a
matter of national security Helms-Burton fell outside of GATT. Moreo-
ver, each side argued that the other's position threatened to undermine
the WTO's dispute resolution procedures. The Clinton administration
warned that the case could create a backlash against the WTO in Con-
gress,45 while the European Union argued that, if each nation were al-
lowed to determine for itself what measures fall within GAIT's national
security exception, the dispute settlement procedure would be "immeas-
urably damaged." 46 In February, over the objection of the United States,
41. See Canada: Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act Incorporating the Amend-
ments Countering the U.S. Helms-Burton Act (Oct. 9, 1996), 36 I.L.M. 111 (1997);
Mexico: Act to Protect Trade and Investment from Foreign Norms that Contravene Inter-
national Law (Oct. 23, 1996), 36 LL.M. 133 (1997); European Union: Council Regula-
tion (EC) No. 2271/96, Protecting Against the Effects of the Extraterritorial Application
of Legislation Adopted by a Third Country (Nov. 22, 1996), 36 I.L.M. 125 (1997).
These blocking and clawback statutes are modeled on the British Protection of Trading
Interests Act, which was passed in response to the extraterritorial application of U.S. an-
titrust law. See United Kingdom: Protection of Trading Interests Act 1980 and Exchange
of Diplomatic Notes Concerning the Act, 21 I.L.M. 834 (1982). For a discussion of
blocking and clawback statutes in the context of antitrust, see Dodge, supra note 13.
42. See Sanctions: Clinton Delays Lawsuits Under Title III of Helms-Burton, 13
INT'LTRADE REP. 29 (July 17, 1996).
43. See Sanctions: Clinton Extends His Suspension of Title I11 of Cuba Law, Canada
Weighs NAFTA Action, 14 INT'LTRADE REP. 42 (Jan. 8, 1997).
44. United States: Statement of the President on Suspending Title III of the Helms-
Burton Act (Jan. 3, 1997), 36 I.L.M. 216 (1997). President Clinton announced renewal
of the suspension on July 16, 1997. See U.S. Suspends Right to Sue Foreign Firms Over
Cuba, WALL ST. J., July 17, 1997, at Al.
45. Nancy Dunne, Eizenstat Warning on Cuba Sanctions Dispute, FIN. TmEs, Feb.
12, 1997, at 4.
46. Guy de Jonquieres, EUDelays Clash on USAnti-Cuba Law, FN. TMs, Feb. 13,
1997, at 5.
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the WTO named a panel to hear the complaint.47 But on the eve of the
hearing, which the United States had threatened to boycott, the two sides
concluded a memorandum of understanding under which the European
Union agreed to suspend the WTO case and to negotiate firs: a bilateral
and then a multilateral agreement to prevent companies from investing in
illegally expropriated assets while the Clinton Administration promised
to continue suspending Title III of Helms-Burton and to seek authority
from Congress to suspend Title IV as well. 48 Whether such an agreement
can be negotiated and congressional authorization to suspend Title IV
can be obtained by the October 15 deadline remains to be seen.
49
I. Deja Vu All Over Again50
The pattern of U.S. extraterritorial regulation, foreign response, and
U.S. accomodation that one sees in the current controversy over the
Helms-Burton Act is reminiscent of two earlier incidents-the Fruehauf
case in the mid-1960s and the Soviet Pipeline dispute in the early
1980s.51 In each of those cases, as in the case of Helms-Burton, the
United States attempted to use domestic law to enlist foreign companies
in the service of its foreign policy goals. In each of those cases, the
United States ultimately backed away from its original position in re-
sponse to foreign objections. And each of those cases helped refine the
47. Guy de Jonquieres & Nancy Dunne, US Leaves Door Ajar in Row with EU over
Cuba Trade, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 21, 1997, at 18. The panel consists of Arthur Dunkel, the
Swiss former director-general of GATT, Tommy Koh, Singapore's ambas,.ador-at-large,
and Edward Woodfield, New Zealand's former chief trade negotiator. Id.
48. See European Union-United States: Memorandum of Understanding Concerning
the U.S. Helms-Burton Act and the U.S. Iran and Libya Sanctions Act (Apr. 11, 1997),
36 I.L.M. 529 (1997).
49. There were early signs that legislators on both sides of the Atlantic were unhappy
about the compromise. The European Pariliament in Strasbourg adopted a resolution
deploring the agreement, see European Union: European Parliament Angry About Han-
dling of Bananas, Helms-Burton, 14 INT'L TRADE REP. 915 (May 21, 1997), while the
U.S. House of Representatives adopted a bill that would tighten, rather than waive, Title
IV. Sanctions: EU Warns It Will Reinstate Complaint on Helms-Burton if Congress
Tightens Law, 14 INT'LTRADE REP. 1069 (June 18, 1997).
50. Attributed to Yogi Berra.
51. Both incidents are helpfully recounted in HENRY J. STEINER, DETLEv F. VAGTS &
HAROLD HONGiU KOH, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS 983-94 (4th ed. 1994) and in
ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, TRADE CONTROLS FOR POLITICAL ENDS 91-105, 268-306 (2d
ed. 1983).
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international law rules on prescriptive jurisdiction over foreign compa-
nies.52
Fruehauf involved the application of U.S. export control restrictions
to a French subsidiary, S.A. Fruehauf-France, that was 70 percent owned
by Fruehauf Corporation, an American company, and 30 percent owned
by French interests. Fruehauf-France bid on and was awarded a contract
to supply trucks for export from France without knowing their ultimate
destination. That destination was the People's Republic of China, to
which "persons subject to the jurisdiction of the United States" or
"owned or controlled" by such persons were prohibited by U.S. law from
exporting. When the U.S. Treasury Department learned of the contract,
it instructed the American parent company to have Fruehauf-France can-
cel the contract or face criminal penalties under U.S. law. When the
American parent complied, the French directors successfully petitioned a
French court to appoint a temporary administrator for Fruehauf-France
who would manage the company and carry out the contract. The ap-
pointment of an administrator was upheld on appeal. 53 Ultimately, the
United States backed down. The Secretary of the Treasury ruled that
with the appointment of a French administrator Fruehauf-France was no
longer a "person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States" and thus
no longer subject to U.S. export control restrictions.54
The Soviet Pipeline dispute involved a similar factual situation and
ended the same way. After the imposition of martial law in Poland,
President Reagan imposed controls on exports of oil and gas equipment
and technology from the United States to the Soviet Union aimed at hin-
dering the construction of a natural gas pipeline from the Soviet Union to
Western Europe. In June 1982, he extended those controls to equipment
manufactured abroad by subsidiaries of U.S. companies and by foreign-
owned licensees of U.S. companies. European governments not only
protested, but ordered subsidiaries of U.S. companies organized under
their laws to honor their contracts and export oil and gas equipment to
52. See RESTATEMENT (THIPRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 414 (1987); see also
id. Reporters' Note 3 (discussing Fruehauf); id. Reporters' Note 8 (discussing Soviet
pipeline).
53. Societe Fruehauf Corp. v. Massardy, [1968] D.S. Jur. 147 (1965), reprinted in
LOWENFELD, supra note 51, at 93-96.
54. STEINER, VAGTs & KOH, supra note 51, at 993; LOWENFELD, supra note 51, at
1997]
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the Soviet Union notwithstanding the U.S. export controls." The U.S.
Commerce Department in turn imposed sanctions on the European sub-
sidiaries by denying them all export privileges. 6 As in the Fruehauf
case, however, the United States ultimately backed down. Using Leonid
Brezhnev's death as an excuse, President Reagan lifted the export con-
trols aimed at the Soviet pipeline in November 1982.57
In each of these cases, the United States ultimately came back into
compliance with international law after being challenged by other interna-
tional actors. Moreover, both incidents served further to define the inter-
national law rules concerning prescriptive jurisdiction over foreign sub-
sidiaries. Section 414 of the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations
Law now generally limits a nation's control over foreign subsidiaries of its
companies to "exceptional cases."58  Of course, the Helms-Burton Act
raises different international law issues than either Fruehauf or the Soviet
Pipeline case. In some respects, Title III of the Act seems less justifiable
than the export controls imposed in those cases because it regulates the
conduct of wholly foreign companies that are not subsidiaries or even li-
censees of U.S. companies. On the other hand, Title II in some respects
seems more justifiable because it is designed to vindicate the nights of U.S.
nationals under international law rather than simply to achieve foreign
policy goals. I compare Helms-Burton to those cases because all three dis-
putes served further to define important issues of international law and all
three disputes generated pressure for compliance with international law. It
is this dynamic that Professor Koh has termed "transnational legal proc-
ess."
59
55. LOWENFELD, supra note 51, at 295. A Netherlands subsidiary of a U.S. company
attempted to raise the U.S. export controls as a defense in a breach of contract action, but
the Dutch court refused to recognized the defense because it concluded that the export
controls exceeded the international law limitation on the United States' jurisdiction to
prescribe. See Compagnie Europ6enne des Petroles S.A. v. Sensor Nederland B.V., Dis-
trict Court at the Hague (Sept. 17, 1982), 22 I.L.M. 66, 72 (1983).
56. LOWENFELD, supra note 51, at 296.
57. Id. at 304.
58. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 414; see also id. Report-
ers' Note 3 (discussing Fruehauf); id. Reporters' Note 8 (discussing Soviet pipeline).
59. Koh, Transnational Legal Process, supra note 14, at 183; Koh, Why Do Nations
Obey?, supra note 14, at 2626; see also Harold Hongju Koh, Refugees, the Courts and
the New World Order, 1994 UTAH L. REv. 999, 1014-18 (discussing Haitian refugees
case as an example of transnational legal process); Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational
Public Law Litigation, 100 YALE L.J. 2347, 2394-2402 (1991) (discussing "the new in-
ternational legal process"); ABRAM CHAYES, THOMAS EHRLICH & ANDREAS F.
LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PROCESS: MATERIALS FOR AN INTRODUCTORY
[Vol.20:713
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I. Helms-Burton and Transnational Legal Process
According to Koh, transnational legal process has four distinctive
features. First, it is "nontraditional" in the sense that it breaks down the
barriers between domestic and international law and public and private
law, which have long characterized international legal scholarship.60
Second, it is "nonstatist." It does not view nation-states as the only ac-
tors who make and enforce international law, but expands its focus to in-
clude international organizations, multinational enterprises, non-
governmental organizations, and private individuals as well.61 Third, it
is "dynamic" rather than static. It "percolates up and down"--from do-
mestic to international to domestic; from private to public to private.62
Finally, it is "normative." It both creates rules of law and works to bring
transnational actors into compliance with international law.63 Transna-
tional legal process breaks down many of the barriers that have some-
times limited international legal scholarship, while also attempting to an-
swer the question "why nations obey"' 54 international law.
The current dispute over the Helms-Burton Act shows transnational
legal process in action. First, it cannot be neatly characterized as do-
mestic or international, as public or private. Helms-Burton is a domestic
law, which authorizes suit in a domestic forum. Yet it is designed to
provide a remedy for an international law violation (Cuba's expropria-
tion of the property of U.S. nationals) and may itself violate both cus-
tomary international law and multilateral treaties like GATT and
65 lasisatoie IaronNAFTA. The lawsuits authorized by Title III are suits by one private
party against another (private-private), yet the genesis of the claims was
the taking of private property by a government (private-public), and the
Act has generated disputes between the United States and other nations
(public-public).
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ridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994).
60. Koh, Transnational Legal Process, supra note 14, at 184.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.; see also Koh, Why Do Nations Obey?, supra note 14, at 2645-58 (suggesting
that obediance derives from a process of interaction, which leads to interpretation of in-
ternational law norms and ultimately to internalization of those norms).
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Second, the key actors in the Helms-Burton dispute are not just na-
tions-states. But for the activities of a non-governmental organization,
Brothers to the Rescue, which led to the downing of two unarmed planes,
Helms-Burton likely would never have become law. Multinational en-
terprises play a key role as potential plaintiffs and potential defendants
under Title III of the Act. Helms-Burton is designed to enlist these en-
terprises in the United States' economic embargo of Cuba, and their
willingness to comply 66 will ultimately determine its effectiveness. Indi-
viduals also play a role again as potential plaintiffs and defendants under
Title II but also as persons who may be excluded from entering the
United States under Title IV because their companies traffic in confis-
cated property. And international organizations like the WTO and the
OAS6 are intimately involved in interpreting and enforcing the rules of
international law implicated by Helms-Burton.
Third, the Helms-Burton dispute is dynamic. It has percolated up
and down from international private-public disputes to domestic private-
private disputes to an international public-public dispute. It began with
the international law claims of private parties against a government that
had expropriated their property. Title III of Helms-Burton transformed
those claims into domestic law claims by one private party against an-
other that may be brought in a domestic forum. Helms-Burton has in
turn prompted claims by foreign governments against the United States
under international law in international fora.
Fourth, and perhaps most important, the dispute over Helms-
Burton-like the Fruehauf and Soviet Pipeline cases -is both shaping
rules of international law and is gradually bringing transnational actors
into compliance with international law. The international law rules
raised by Helms-Burton are many: whether Helms-Burton violates GATT
or NAFTA and the scope of the national security exception under each;
69
the international law limits on prescriptive jurisdiction;70 what consti-
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69. See Yoo, supra note 6, at 751-54; Fidler, supra note 2, at 311-13; Welke, supra
note 2.
70. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATONS LAW §§ 402 & 404 (listing
recognized bases for jurisdiction to prescribe). The Helms-Burton Act asserts that Title
III is based on effects jurisdiction. Helms-Burton Act § 301(9) ("International law rec-
ognizes that a nation has the ability to provide for rules of law with respect to conduct
outside its territory that has or is intended to have substantial effect within its territory.").
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tutes a "secondary boycott" and whether such boycotts are permissible
under international law;71 whether Cuba violated international law when
it confiscated the property of its own citizens;72 whether multinational
enterprises violate international law when they "traffic in" confiscated
property; 73 whether Helms-Burton may be justified as a "countermea-
sure" to remedy a violation of international law even if would not other-
wise be permissible;74 whether the blocking and clawback laws adopted
by Canada, Mexico and the European Union may be justified as "coun-
termeasures" to Helms-Burton; 75 and whether Helms-Burton violates in-
ternational claims practice by espousing the claims of persons who were
Others have asserted that Title II may be based on territorial or protective jurisdiction.
The Libertad Act: Implementation and International Law: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Western Hemisphere and Peace Corps Affairs of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Rela-
tions, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. 27, 29 (July 30, 1996) [hereinafter Senate Hearing] (state-
ment of Monroe Leigh). The jurisdictional basis that seems to fit Title III most closely is
the so-called "passive personality principle" under which a nation applies its law to an
act committed outside its territory by a non-national on the ground that the victim was a
national. The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law states that "[tihe principle
has not been generally accepted for ordinary torts or crimes, but it is increasingly ac-
cepted as applied to terrorist and other organized attacks on a state's nationals by reason
of their nationality, or to assassination of a state's diplomatic representatives or other of-
ficials." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS L w § 402, comment g. See
also Yoo, supra note 6, at 747-49 (arguing that Helms-Burton does not rest on a recog-
nized basis for prescriptive jurisdiction).
71. See Lowenfeld, supra note 2, at 429-30 (characterizing Helms-Burton as a sec-
ondary boycott); Senate Hearing, supra note 70, at 29-30 (statement of Monroe Leigh)
(arguing that Helms-Burton is not a secondary boycott and that secondary boycotts do
not violate international law).
72. See Helms Burton Act § 302(a)(4)(C) (permitting U.S. nationals who were Cu-
ban citizens at the time of expropriation to bring suit beginning two years after the date
of enactment); Muse, supra note 8, at 769-81 (arguing that confiscations by a state of the
property of its own nationals do not violate international law).
73. See Inter-American Juridical Committee Opinion, supra note 5, at para. 5(e)
("Any use by national of a third State of expropriated property located in the expropriat-
ing State where such use conforms to the laws of that State, as well as the use anywhere
of products or intangible property not constituting the expropriated asset itself, does not
contravene any norm of international law."); Clagett, Who Is Breaking International
Law, supra note 2 (arguing that trafficking in expropriated property violates international
law).
74. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 905 (a state victim of
an international law violation may resort to proportional countermeasures that might oth-
erwise be unlawful to remedy the violation, subject to the prohibitions on the threat or
use of force in the U.N. Charter).
75. See id.
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not U.S. citizens at the time the claim arose.76 The dispute over Helms-
Burton will shape the international law rules that govern each of these
areas and the rules that emerge will influence not just the resolution of
this dispute but the future interaction of state and nonstate actors.
But transnational legal process is "normative" not just because it
shapes rules of international law but also because it works to bring trans-
national actors into compliance with international law. "It predicts that
nations will come into compliance with international norms if transna-
tional legal processes are aggressively triggered by other transnational
actors."7 ' Nations do so not just because it is in their interest to do so or
because they identify themselves as law abiding states but because their
violations of international law hinder their ongoing participation within
the international system and because international law norms are inter-
nalized by states in their domestic and political structures. 711 In both the
Fruehauf case and the Soviet Pipeline dispute, the United States ulti-
mately backed away from applying its export controls in a way that was
at least questionable under international law after those controls were
challenged by other nations. In President Clinton's suspension of Title
Ir, 79 one sees the same dynamic at work. The United States' violation of
international law norms (whether one considers them to be existing or
emerging) has been aggressively challenged by other nations and this, in
turn, has pressured the United States towards compliance with interna-
tional law by suspending the right of action under Title II.
Here, however, there is an important difference between Helms-
Burton on the one hand and the Fruehauf case and the Soviet Pipeline
dispute on the other. In the Fruehauf and Soviet Pipeline cases, the trade
restriction was adopted administratively and could be repealed by the
President acting alone. Because Helms-Burton was enacted by Congress,
President Clinton must secure the support of both houses of Congress to
modify its restrictions. Thus, the United States may not come back into
full compliance with international law unless Congress as well as the
President respond to the pressure being exerted by the United States' al-
lies through diplomatic channels and in fora like the WTO and OAS. If
the Helms-Burton dispute ultimately wrecks the WTO's dispute settle-
ment procedures, congressional "meddling" in foreign affairs will inevi-
76. See Kaye, supra note 4, at 736-38.
77. Koh, Transnational Legal Process, supra note 14, at 206.
78. Id. at 199-205.
79. See supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
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tably be blamed and the argument that the President should conduct for-
eign policy alone will grow stronger.
Professor Koh has previously argued persuasively that the foreign
affairs power is and ought to be a power shared.80 Ideally, the Presi-
dent's relationship with Congress would be such that he would formulate
foreign policy in consultation with Congress and Congress would trust
him with its implementation. Indeed, it appears to be the Republican
Congress' distrust of President Clinton that resulted in Helms-Burton
containing so little discretion for the President.
8 1
But the Helms-Burton episode also raises the interesting question
why the President seems to have internalized international law norms to
a greater extent than Congress, at least in this instance.82 The answer
may lie in the fact that it is chiefly the Executive Branch that is engaged
in interaction with other nations.8 3 Or it may lie in Congress' lack of an
institution comparable to the State Department's Office of the Legal Ad-
visor or the Justice Department's Office of Legal Counsel which would
advise Congress on issues of international law.84 The question of com-
parative institutional competence is an old one in legal process scholar-
ship,85 and Helms-Burton presents a fascinating study for those inter-
80. HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURIrY CONSTITUTION: SHARING
POWER AFrER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR (1990).
81. See Yoo, supra note 6, at 765.
82. I do not mean to suggest that the President always stands on the side of interna-
tional law and that Congress always stands against it. Professor Koh points to the Anti-
Ballistic Missile Treaty Reinterpretation Debate as an instance of transnational legal pro-
cess in which pressure from the Senate ultimately brought the President back into com-
pliance with international law. See Koh, Why Do Nations Obey?, supra note 14, at
2646-48. Arguably in that case, however, the Senate was principally defending not in-
ternational law but its own constitutional role in the treaty process.
83. See i. at 2646, 2656 (arguing that interaction promotes internalization).
84. Cf. KOH, supra note 80, at 169-71 (suggesting the creation of a congressional
legal advisor to strengthen Congress' hand in foreign affairs).
85. See, e.g., HART & SACKS, supra note 59, at 341-42; CHAYES, EHRLICH &
LOWENFELD, supra note 59, at xii. This theme has also figured in a number of prominent
international law decisions. See, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S.
398, 423 (1964) ('The act of state doctrine.., concerns the competency of dissimilar
institutions to make and implement particular kinds of decisions in the area of interna-
tional relations."); Laker Airways v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 953-
55 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (discussing comparative competence of courts and the political
branches to resolve conflicts of legislative jurisdiction). For a discussion of the ability of
different institutions to achieve international cooperation in the regulation of interna-
tional business, see Dodge, supra note 13.
1997]
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
ested in Congress' competence in dealing with issues of international law
and the possibilities of institutional reform to promote such competence.
The final pages of Helms-Burton's story have yet to be written. It
may end happily with the conclusion of a multilateral agreement gov-
erning investment in expropriated property86 and the indefinite suspen-
sion or even the repeal of the Helms-Burton Act. Or it may end with the
United States withdrawing from the WTO dispute resolution system as it
withdrew from the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of
Justice in the 1980s. One thing, however, is certain-whatever the ulti-
mate resolution of the Helms-Burton dispute, it will stand as an impor-
tant chapter in the development of international law and of transnational
legal process.
86. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
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